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Abstract
This paper discusses the importance of a unique digital
certificate for the world wide use of public-key infrastruc-
ture and the impact such a unique digital certificate will
have on the players. First, the basic concepts of public-key
infrastructure are presented. Special interest is put on the
concepts important for the use of identity-based digital
certificates. Then, an overview of the Austrian situation in
the international context is given and the key factors for the
success of digital certificates are presented.
Digital certificates
There is a broad range of applications for digital certifi-
cates: electronic banking, electronic payment systems, e-
mail communication, identification in communication with
public authorities (e.g. tax declaration, court documents,
electronic passports, public health service, etc.), electronic
contracts, selective web access, selective database access,
etc. In this context, several questions come up:
• Which players will provide the future infrastructure for
digital certificates (governmental institutions, financial
service providers, IT companies or others)?
• What are the key-factors for a successful provider of
digital certificates?
• How should governments regulate the emerging market
of digital certificates?
• Can nationally isolated solutions successfully survive?
• Is the combination of access-control, encryption and
signature in one ”product” important for the success?
To get the answers to the above questions it is first nec-
essary to understand the concepts of public-key infrastruc-
ture and then examine the behaviour of the players in this
market.
Public-key cryptography
Public-key cryptography is a key-factor for the solution
of the transaction security problems arising with the com-
mercial use of the internet: authenticity, integrity, confi-
dentiality and non-repudiation (Bhimani, 1996). Public-key
algorithms are mainly used in two ways:
• Encryption and decryption
Messages which are encrypted with the public key of
the recipient can only be decrypted with the respective
private key. In this way, only the possessor of the re-
cipient’s private key can read the message which can
be encrypted by any person, provided that the key
management guarantees the correct distribution of the
public key to the potential senders. In reality the mes-
sage is first encrypted with a symmetric algorithm, and
then the symmetric key is encrypted with the public key
of the recipient. This is called a digital envelope
(PKCS, 1993), (Kaliski and Kingdon, 1997). With
public-key-encryption, the authenticity of the recipient
and the confidentiality can be guaranteed.
• Digital signatures
Messages can be signed encrypting a message digest
(created by a hash function) with the private key of the
sender. Any person in possession of the public key of
the sender is in grade of verifying the signature by de-
crypting the message digest with the public key of the
sender and comparing the result to the message digest
of the received message created by the same hash
function. Digital signatures guarantee the integrity of
the message and the authenticity of the sender. Addi-
tionally, non-repudiation can be realised by the signing
of both sender and recipient.
Key and certificate management
In the procedures described above, the distribution and
management of the public key is the crucial point. It must
be guaranteed that the key really belongs to the respective
person (or e-mail address or authorisation role).
A means to guarantee this, is the use of digital certifi-
cates. They are digital documents containing the public key,
the name of the possessor, the digital signature of the certi-
fication authority (CA) that issued the certificate and the
certificate validity period. In this way the problem of key
management is reduced to the public key of the CA. Once
in possession of the trustworthy public key, the end user is
able to verify all certificates issued by the certification
authority. The function of a CA is therefore the verification
of the identity of the certificate holder. This process follows
the certification practice statement (CPS) of the CA

























Figure 1. Certification and registration authorities
(Hously et al., 1998)
In the architectural model of the PKIX Working Group
(see Figure 1) there is an additional optional system called
registration authority (RA). The CA delegates certain man-
agement functions to the RA. Unexpired certificates can be
revoked using a periodically-issued certificate revocation
list (CRL). In recent research there are considerations to
eliminate the CRL, because its handling has its drawbacks
and there are other methods to verify the validity of a pre-
sented certificate (Rivest, 1998).
The certification of identity is only the simplest form of
a certificate. With version 3 the digital certificates follow-
ing the ISO X.509 standard are provided with extensions
for the certification of attributes (ITU-T, 1993). Similar
extensions are provided with role-based systems as the
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) (Ellison et al.,
1997). With the use of application-specific extensions, the
function of the certification authority is extended to the
verification of the respective attributes of the certificate
holders.
Trusted third parties and
cross certification
The world-wide use of certificates causes the emerging
of a large number of certificate issuers. One cause for this is
that a certificate issuer needs a certain regional presence in
order to verify the identity of a person. From this point of
view, it makes sense that an organisation issuing certificates
consists of a large number of locally operating entities,
independent from each other. For the end users, the man-
agement of different trustworthy public keys is not applica-
ble, because each of these would have to be transmitted in a
secure way.
This problem can be solved by the use of cross certifi-
cates (ITU-T, 1993), (Nusser, 1998). These are certificates
issued by a CA certifying another CA. In this way, an end
user is able to verify a certificate issued by a CA whose
public key was not directly transmitted to the end user. For
the verification, there must only be a link via cross certifi-
cates to the CA whose trustworthy public key is with the
end user. This link is also called certification path or chain
of trust. The CA whose trustworthy public key is provided
is called trusted third party (Rüppel and Wildhaber, 1995).
Using these mechanisms, a system can be built that
consists of several certification authorities issuing certifi-
cates for individuals but also building links between each
other using cross certificates. In an ideal situation, each end
user is able to verify the certificates of any other person
using only one trusted third party in this system. The com-
bination of certification authorities linked to each other via
cross certificates and the end users is called public-key
infrastructure (Schneier, 1996).
The Austrian situation
in the international context
In Austria, there are several institutions trying to be the
first in providing a nation-wide infrastructure for digital
signatures. There are activities in three fields:
1. Certification authorities offering certificates for clients,
servers and developers: GlobalSign by Innovation
Systems, AD-Cert by ARGE Daten and A-Sign by da-
takom Austria.
2. Public authorities are preparing for the use of digital
signatures and certificates for the communication with
the citizens. So, the ”Bundesrechenzentrum” (federal
computing centre) takes steps to provide the necessary
infrastructure.
3. Europay Austria, operator of the Austrian cash-
dispensers, a very important player in the credit card
business and the operator of the ”Quick” electronic
wallet, plans to issue a signature card especially for fi-
nancial services and uses the SET standard (SET,
1997) for credit card payment on the internet.
The co-operation with some of these key players in
Austria helps to identify the key factors and to test the re-
search results in practice.
On the juridical side there is a model law on electronic
commerce issued by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL, 1996), there are
cryptography guidelines issued by the OECD (OECD,
1997), some US states have their own laws on cryptography
or digital certification, there is a directive of the EU con-
cerning a common framework for electronic signatures and
in some member countries of the EU there are laws on
digital certification. In Austria there is a draft (Mayer-
Schönberger et al., 1999) for a law on digital signatures
which is very near to the German law and decree. This draft
provides a licensing authority that is with the Austrian
Telekom-Control commission.
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Key factors for the use of digital certificates
The different players (end users, public authorities, fi-
nancial service providers, etc.) have different utility func-
tions. The following are some examples of key factors for
the players:
1. For end users the cost of the certificate, the simplicity of
use, the variety of applications (interoperability) and
the number of potential partners are key factors.
2. For public authorities a high security level for identity
certification is important (e.g. electronic passport).
3. For financial service providers the cost of the system,
the number of potential customers and the attributes
certified by a certificate are important key factors.
With the utility functions of the players a model of the
”game of certification” with the adequate payoff matrices
can be built to show different scenarios of the development
of public-key infrastructure use.
Conclusions
As we have seen, the success of digital certificates does
not only depend on the technical process of certification or
on the key length (even if there are very important issues in
these fields) but mainly on the ease of use and the variety of
applications for the user and the service provider. So, it
seems to be very important that the mass of the users (the
typical consumers) is provided with a unique digital certifi-
cate to carry out all standard functions (secure e-mail, tax
declaration, banking, payment, etc.). This way, the use of
digital certificates can reach a critical level. To enable the
interoperability of digital certificates cross certification
between the different CAs is a crucial point. The client of a
bank provided with a digital certificate issued by her bank
has additional utility using this certificate also for other
applications, e.g. private or official e-mail. For the service
providers a world-wide public-key infrastructure implies
new opportunities, new customers and new business fields.
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